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Abstract
An economy can improve its technology level through two channels – imitating from the
world technology frontier and innovating on its own technology level – innovation being
more skilled-intensive than imitation. An endogenous growth model is considered where
education decision depends on the cognitive ability of an individual as well as on the
parental income. Child of a rich parent has higher probability to become educated than
the child of a poor parent. It is shown that more equal society leads to higher upward and
downward mobilities. Growth enhancing education policy leads to absolute convergence of
all the economies to the world technology frontier. In the imitation-innovation regime, life
time utility gap within skilled and unskilled human capital rise due to parental income
differences. Moreover, life time utility gap within skilled human capital rises due to
cognitive ability differences.
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Intergenerational Mobility
1 Introduction
Aghion et al. [2009], Vandenbussche et al. [2006] and Basu and Mehra [2014] bring out
the contribution of the different composition of human capital to economy-wide
technological improvements through the twin channels of imitation and innovation.
Technological progress is a dualistic phenomenon which uses human capital inputs
differently at different stages of development (in terms of its distance to the world
technology frontier). Theoretically, it is shown that when an economy is far away from
the world technology frontier, imitation of technologies is the main engine of total factor
productivity (TFP) growth. In comparison, as an economy bridges its gap from the
world technology leader, the scope of imitation falls and the dependence on innovation
activity rises. Technologically sufficiently advanced economies rely on innovation
activity (constitute innovation-only regime) alone whereas technologically sufficiently
backward economies perform only imitation activity (form the imitation-only regime).
Intermediate economies perform both the activities (represent imitation-innovation
regime). This work aims to extend this line of research to address the relation between
the intergenerational mobilities (upward and downward mobilities) of individuals and
between (skilled and unskilled) group wage inequality of an economy depending on the
level of development when individuals are credit constrained.1 On the consumption
side, income of an individual depends not only on its own talent and income level but
also on the education decision of his/ her parent and grandparent and so on.
Intergenerational income of individuals is related through the level of bequest that
parents left for their children. Rich parent can leave higher bequest than a poor parent.
This may give a higher opportunity of becoming rich to a child of a rich parent and
lesser opportunity to a child of a poor parent. This implies that, different generations
are connected on the production side through the endogenous evolution of technology
over time, and on the consumption side through income distributions of previous
generations. Thus, in a dynamic setting, growth rate, aggregate income and
1Upward mobility captures the probability of becoming educated given that parent did not has formal
education and downward mobility implies probability of not getting a formal education given that parent
was educated.
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intergenerational mobilities of an economy are determined by the interaction of these
two interrelated components. This study focuses on the convergence possibility of an
economy to the world technology frontier. Additionally, life time utility gaps within
skilled human capital due to difference in cognitive ability at various stages of
technological development have been examined in this part of research. Life time utility
gaps within skilled as well as within unskilled human capital due to parental income
differences have also been investigated. Moreover, the impact of the different
components of human capital on economic growth depending on its distance to frontier
have been studied.
By looking at the literature on intergenerational mobility and inequality, it is found
that Galor and Tsiddon [1997], with perfect capital market, shows that a major
technological invention initially raises inequality and consequently mobility. Over time,
as technology becomes more accessible, both mobility and inequality decrease. There
exists a positive relation between inequality and intergenerational mobility in the short
run. Becker and Tomes [1986] also shows that intergenerational mobility is smaller when
endowments are transferred from parents to children. Without considering that the
return to education changes over time, under imperfect capital market Becker and
Tomes [1979] and Becker and Tomes [1986] and Loury [1981] show that a more equal
society leads to higher mobility and economic development. But, with the assumption of
capital market imperfection, Owen and Weil [1998] and Maoz and Moav [1999] show
that inequality and mobility move in opposite directions.2 While Owen and Weil [1998]
characterizes only the steady state condition, Maoz and Moav [1999] charts out the
transitional dynamics of inequality, mobility and allocation of education along the
growth path and shows that both downward and upward mobilities increase as an
economy progresses technologically. But none of these studies address the issue of
technological progress over time and interaction of it with inequality and mobility.
Hassler et al. [2007] shows that differences in skill-biased technology or wage
compression exhibits a positive relation between inequality and mobility.3 An economy
2The empirical support for this can be found in Andrews and Leigh [2009].
3Wage compression implies that differences in wages between skilled and unskilled human capital is
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with higher skill-biased technology or with lower wage compression leads to a higher
inequality and higher mobility and vise versa. This holds under the assumption that
poor parents not only have less ability to spend on children’s education but also have a
lower willingness to pay for it. Das [2007] shows that initial income differences persist
even under convex technology and convex preferences. Empirical findings of Solon
[1992], Solon [2002] and Lee and Solon [2009] show that intergenerational correlation in
the long run income is relatively high for both son’s and daughter’s income. By
considering macroeconomic dynamics, Borjas [1992] empirically shows that the skills of
the current generation depend not only on parental income but also on the average skills
of the ethnic group in the parent’s generation. However, none of these studies have
considered the possibility of endogenous Research and Development (R & D) based
approach in the analysis of intergenerational mobilities and inequality.
This research also sheds light on the existing literatures on the relation between the
composition of human capital and growth. Vandenbussche et al. [2006] finds that, when
economies are in the imitation-innovation regime, skilled human capital is growth
enhancing for a relatively advanced economy while unskilled human capital does the
same for a relatively backward economy. Their study assigned different degrees of
importance to skilled and unskilled human capital, based on the distance of the
economy to the world technology frontier. This is able to solve the puzzle posed by
Krueger and Lindahl [2001] that education has positive and significant impact on
growth only for the technologically backward economy but has negative and insignificant
impact for the rich countries. This nonlinear relation between human capital and
economic growth is also supported by Durlauf and Johnson [1995] and Kalaitzidakis
et al. [2001]. Vandenbussche et al. [2006] provides the explanation that unskilled human
capital is more efficient in imitation activity and the scope of imitation is higher in a
technologically backward economy. This line of argument is similar to Nelson and
Phelps [1966]. On the contrary, Romer [1990] and Grossman and Helpman [1991] show
that education favors the innovation of new technology (technologically advanced
lower than the productivity level of them. A state with higher labor regulations or stronger labor union
exhibits higher wage compression, that is, it leads to a more equal society.
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economy rely more on innovation activity) and skilled human capital is more efficient in
it. By allowing inter-state migration, Aghion et al. [2009] also supports the theory
postulated by Vandenbussche et al. [2006]. But both the earlier papers, that is,
Vandenbussche et al. [2006] and Aghion et al. [2009] have assumed that there exists an
exogenously given composition of human capital and it remains fixed irrespective of the
distance of the economy to the frontier. Basu and Mehra [2014] endogenize the skill
composition of an economy, based on an individual’s decision to acquire education
depending on the heterogeneous cognitive ability among individual’s and shows the
importance of skilled human capital in the diversified regime irrespective of its distance
to frontier. Moreover, their study shows that skilled human capital is also growth
enhancing in the innovation-only regime while unskilled human capital does the same
job in the imitation-only regime.
This work also interfaces with the existing literatures on convergence theory. In
growth theory, there exist two types of convergence hypothesis. First, β convergence
implies that a poor country grows at a rate faster than the richer one. This induces that
a catch up process is underway. Second, σ convergence measures the cross-sectional
dispersion of the logarithm of per capita income or output across different countries. It
is found that β convergence is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for σ
convergence. Now, conditional β convergence implies that there exists β convergence
among the countries if they are structurally identical/ similar. Using the classical
approach Barro et al. [1991], Barro et al. [1992] and Sala-i Martin [1994], Sala-i Martin
[1996] show that there exists cross-sectional conditional β and σ convergence among the
US states and for across different countries for different time periods. Convergence rate
is roughly at 2 percent per year. But by using cointegration, Bernard and Durlauf [1995]
shows very little evidence of the convergence of output. By criticizing the earlier
methodology, Quah [1996a], Quah [1996b], Quah [1996c] Quah [1997], Quah [1999],
Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes [2005] and Maasoumi et al. [2007] empirically show that
income distribution is polarizing into twin peaks of rich and poor; that is, poor are
becoming poorer, rich are getting richer and the proportion of the middle income group
countries are reducing. With the assumption that an economy improves its technology
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level only through innovation, Howitt [2000] theoretically demonstrates the possibility of
club convergence. With nonparametric analysis Mayer-Foulkes [2002] shows that, in the
long run, the world income converges in three steady states – semi-stagnation,
semi-development and development, depending on whether countries have overcome
barriers to human capital and technological innovation. By making the assumption that
as technology level increases, innovation becomes more difficult, Howitt and
Mayer-Foulkes [2005] theoretically shows club convergence. Aghion and Howitt [2006],
Di Maria and Stryszowski [2009] and Basu and Mehra [2014] show that without any
distortion, such as migration, technology transfer from advanced to backward economy
leads to absolute convergence in the long run.
Next, the key findings of this analysis for imperfect credit market have been elaborated:
1. A technologically sufficiently backward economy with low relative composition of
skilled-unskilled human capital specializes in the imitation activity. This regime
has been known as imitation-only regime. As the distance from the world
technology frontier falls or the relative skill composition of the economy rises, it
moves from the imitation-only regime to imitation-innovation regime.4 In the
diversified regime, the economy performs both the imitation and the innovation
activities for technology enhancement. After that, the economy shifts from the
imitation-innovation regime to innovation-only regime (performs only innovation
activity) if either the economy becomes sufficiently technologically advanced or
relative composition of skilled-unskilled human capital is significantly high.
2. The features of the labor market equilibrium conditions for the diversified regime
as well as for the specialized regimes have been emphasized. The assumption that
innovation is relatively skilled human capital intensive implies that reliance on
unskilled human capital is relatively more for the imitation activity (under
(contant returns to scale (CRS)) production structure). In equilibrium this
translates into a lower proportion of skilled human capital than unskilled human
capital in the imitation-only regime. Moreover, the importance of the imitation
4This regime is also known as diversified regime.
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falls as an economy progresses. Given that diminishing effect of the imitation
activity has similar effect to both the factors, there exists a constant proportion of
equilibrium composition of skilled and unskilled human capital in the imitation-only
regime as an economy progresses to the world technology leader.
As an economy progresses further, the scope of imitation falls. However, the
opportunity for innovation rises. The assumption that innovation is skilled human
capital intensive implies that the equilibrium proportion of skilled human capital
rises and unskilled human capital falls as an economy progresses technologically in
the diversified regime. Consequently, both skilled and unskilled human capital shift
from the imitation to the innovation activity in the diversified regime as an
economy bridges the gap from the frontier.
Finally, at the other extreme, an economy may depend on innovation activity only
for future technology improvement. The assumption that innovation is more
skilled intensive entails that the equilibrium proportion of skilled human capital is
higher than unskilled human capital in the innovation-only regime. Further, there
exists constant composition of human capital in the innovation-only regime (since
productivity of both the factors change at the same rate) as an economy moves
toward the world technology frontier.
3. This analysis illustrates the growth path of an economy depending on its distance
from the frontier. In the imitation-only regime, as an economy progresses, the
scope of imitation falls and as an outcome of which growth rate falls. There exists
a declining trend displayed by the growth path of an economy in the imitation-only
regime. In the diversified regime, there exists a U-shaped growth curve as the
economy progresses. That is, growth rate initially falls only to rise later. However,
the innovation-only regime exhibits a constant growth rate.
4. The long run dynamics of an economy is such that by implementing a growth
enhancing education policy, the economy moves from the imitation-only regime to
the imitation-innovation regime and finally to the innovation-only regime. In the
long run, all the economies will converge to the world technology frontier and will
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grow at the same rate. There exists absolute convergence among the economies.
5. The analysis also focuses on the wage rate of skilled and unskilled workers and the
wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers in the three regimes. In the
imitation-only (resp. innovation-only) regime, the marginal productivity of both
skilled and unskilled human capital fall (resp. rise) that leads to a reduction (resp.
increment) in the wage rate of skilled and unskilled workers as an economy moves
toward the world technology frontier. Moreover, a constant level of wage inequality is
found to prevail between skilled and unskilled workers in both the specialized regimes.
In the imitation-innovation regime, as the economy progresses, the importance of
innovation rises and that of imitation falls. Consequently, the marginal productivity
of skilled human capital rises and unskilled human capital falls which leads to an
increment (resp. decrement) in the wage rate of skilled (resp. unskilled) workers
in the diversified regime. Additionally, between skilled and unskilled groups, wage
inequality rises as an economy moves to the frontier.
6. There exists a constant proportion of upward and downward mobilities in the
imitation-only and innovation-only regimes (since a constant wage inequality
prevails between skilled and unskilled workers). In the diversified regime,
education becomes more correlated with the parental income and less related with
the cognitive ability (as between group wage inequality rises) as the economy
progresses. The proportion of both upward and downward mobilities decrease in the
imitation-innovation regime.
7. In the imitation-innovation regime as an economy progresses, the wage inequality
between skilled and unskilled groups rises. This implies that the gap between the
levels of bequest that an individual receives from his/ her parent rises given the
difference in the parental education status. Some of the individuals who are working
as skilled (resp. unskilled) today, had their parents skilled whereas others had
unskilled parents. So, levels of bequests received by today’s skilled (resp. unskilled)
workers vary according to their parental income status. Consequently, within skilled
(resp. unskilled) human capital, wealth gap rises depending on whether the parent
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was educated or not. This leads to an increase in the life time utility gap within
both skilled and unskilled human capital due to parental income differences in the
diversified regime. There exists a constant level of life time utility gap within skilled
and unskilled human capital due to parental income differences in the imitation-
only and innovation-only regimes (since there exists a constant between group wage
inequality).
8. In the diversified regime, relative skilled composition of human capital rises as an
economy moves toward the world technology frontier, which implies that
individuals with relatively less cognitive ability now become skilled. As a result of
this, wage inequality within skilled workers rises due to difference in cognitive
ability. This in turn implies that life time utility gap within skilled workers
increases due to difference in cognitive ability irrespective of whether the parent
was skilled or unskilled in the imitation-innovation regime. There exists a constant
level of life time utility gap within skilled group due to difference in the cognitive
ability in the imitation-only and innovation-only regimes (since there exists
constant proportion of skilled and unskilled human capital in the specialized
regimes).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the basic structure of the model is
discussed. Section 3 contains the key analytical results for a decentralized market
economy. The labor market clearing condition and the equilibrium growth rate of the
economy and wage paths of both skilled and unskilled workers for three different regimes
are derived. Followed by this the balanced growth path for the economy in the
decentralized equilibrium is characterized. The intergenerational upward and downward
mobilities and the life time utility gap due to parental income differences as well as due
to difference in cognitive ability have also been studied. Additionally, some comparative
static analysis has been done with respect to the cost of education. Section 4 concludes
this work. Moreover, direction future research is provided. In what follows immediately,
is the structure of the economy.
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2 The Economic Environment
To begin with the production structure of the economy, which resembles the Aghion and
Howitt [1992] creative destruction model with quality ladders has been elaborated. Next,
the focus is placed on the structure of the dynamics of technology improvement of different
economies depending on their distance from the world technology frontier. This structure
is in line with Vandenbussche et al. [2006], where the technology enhancement depends
on both the imitation and the innovation activities. Followed by this, the consumption
side of the economy has been demonstrated. Individuals care for their children and the
capital market is imperfect, as in Maoz and Moav [1999]. First, the discussion starts with
the production side.
2.1 Production
There are finite numbers of small open economies. Similar to Aghion and Howitt [1992], in
each economy there is an entrepreneur, who is engaged in the production of a final output
in a perfectly competitive market. There are continuum of mass one of intermediate input
producers, who produce the monopoly output, and invest their monopoly profit in the R
& D activity. In each time period t, with certainty one intermediate producer invents the
highest available technology/ blueprint for each of the intermediate goods and after that
he/ she produces the good with this technology/ blueprint. In the next period, he/ she
leaves the market and a new intermediate input producer arrives. There exists free entry
and exit in the R & D sector. R & D sector is perfectly competitive. Price of final good
is normalized to one. All modeling is done using discrete time interval.
The final output is produced competitively, by using land and continuum of mass
one of intermediate inputs. Cobb-Douglas production function of the following form is
considered:
Yt+1 = l
1−α
t+1
∫ 1
0
A1−αi,t+1x
α
i,t+1di, 0 < α < 1,
where i denotes the ith intermediate sector, Yt+1 is the final output in period t+ 1, lt+1 is
the total amount of land, Ai,t+1 is the technology level in sector i in period t+ 1 and xi,t+1
is the amount of intermediate input used in sector i in period t + 1. For simplicity, the
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total supply of land is normalized to one.
Final good sector produces under perfect competition. Therefore, the price of each of
the intermediate inputs i is equal to its marginal product, that is,
pi,t+1 =
∂Yt+1
∂xi,t+1
= αA1−αi,t+1x
α−1
i,t+1,
where pi,t+1 denotes price of the intermediate input in sector i in period t + 1. Each
intermediate input producer chooses output by maximizing the present discounted value of
future profits. Since each intermediate input producer works for one time period only the
maximization exercise is equivalent to maximize the profit period by period. Monopolist
chooses xi,t+1 by solving
max
xi,t+1
(pi,t+1xi,t+1 − xi,t+1).
Accordingly, the monopolist produces the following amount of the intermediate good in
sector i in period t+ 1:
xi,t+1 = α
2
1−αAi,t+1.
The profit of the intermediate input producer is:
pii,t+1 = (pi,t+1 − 1)xi,t+1 =
(
1
α
− 1
)
α
2
1−αAi,t+1 = δAi,t+1, (1)
where δ =
(
1
α
− 1)α 21−α .
Note that both the equilibrium level of production and the profit of the intermediate
input producer in sector i in period t + 1 are linearly dependent on the local/ national
technology level in sector i in that period. Both the technology adjusted intermediate
inputs and the profit are same for all the sectors in every period.
2.2 Dynamics of Productivity
Technological progress depends not only on the innovation upon local/ national technology
level but also on the imitation of technology from the world technology frontier. This is
similar to Benhabib and Spiegel [1994] and Acemoglu et al. [2006]. However, in both
these papers, technology improvement depends on the total stock of human capital and
not on its composition. This implies that whether skilled or unskilled human capital are
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engaged in imitation or innovation activities, does not have any impact on technology
enhancement. This is a rather restrictive assumption. So, by improving upon this, a
specification as in Vandenbussche et al. [2006] and Aghion et al. [2009] is considered.
Imitation and innovation activities require both skilled and unskilled human capital, but
with differing intensity of use for each type of activity. It is assumed that innovation is
relatively skilled human capital intensive. In a CRS frame work, it implies that imitation
is unskilled human capital intensive. This entails that a technologically backward (resp.
advanced) economy specializes in imitation (resp. innovation) activity. The intermediate
economies perform both the activities.5
2.2.1 Imitation-Only Regime
The technology improvement specification of an economy which is in the imitation-only
regime is:
Ai,t+1 = Ai,t + λU˜
σ
i,t+1S˜
1−σ
i,t+1
1
At+1
(At − At), λ > 0, (2)
where, U˜i,t+1 and S˜i,t+1 respectively measure the level of unskilled and skilled human capital
in the imitation-only regime, σ is the elasticity of unskilled human capital in the imitation
activity and λ captures the efficiency of the overall technology improvement. At measures
the aggregate technology level of the concerned economy in period t, where, At =
1∫
0
Aitdi.
At measures the aggregate technology level of the world leader, such that, At =
1∫
0
Aitdi.
(At − At) captures the scope of imitation, that is, the gap of the concerned economy’s
technology level from the world leader. Along with the advantage of backwardness, there
also exists a disadvantage of backwardness, as mentioned by Gerschenkron et al. [1962]
and Howitt [2000]. This is captured by the scope of imitation being divided by its targeted
world technology level, that is, At+1. More advanced the world leader, more difficult it is
to imitate for a backward economy.
5Lemma 3 in Subsection 3.4 in page 30 shows that this is true in equilibrium.
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2.2.2 Imitation-Innovation Regime
The technology improvement pattern for an economy which is in the imitation-innovation
regime is postulated as:
Ai,t+1 = Ai,t + λ
[
uσmi,t+1s
1−σ
mi,t+1
1
At+1
(At − At) + γ uφni,t+1s1−φni,t+1At
]
, γ > 0, (3)
where, umi,t+1 and smi,t+1 respectively denote the amount of unskilled and skilled human
capital engaged in the imitation activity in the diversified regime, uni,t+1 and sni,t+1
respectively measure the amount of unskilled and skilled human capital employed in the
innovation activity in the diversified regime, φ is the elasticity of unskilled human
capital in the innovation activity and γ measures the relative efficiency of innovation as
compared to imitation. This implies that an economy can improve its technology level
through two channels: imitation captured by (At − At) and innovation reflected in the
level of At.
2.2.3 Innovation-Only Regime
In the innovation-only regime, an economy is so advanced that technology enhancement
depends on innovation only – the efficiency by which skilled and unskilled human capital
innovate determines the next period technology level.6 The technology evolution process
for this specialized advanced economy is characterized by:
Ai,t+1 = Ai,t + λγÛ
φ
i,t+1Ŝ
1−φ
i,t+1At, (4)
where, Ûi,t+1 and Ŝi,t+1 respectively measure the level of unskilled and skilled human capital
in the innovation-only regime.
To satisfy the basic assumption that innovation is relatively skilled human capital
intensive than imitation, the following specific assumption is made:
A1. The elasticity of skilled human capital is higher in the innovation activity than
in the imitation activity, that is, σ > φ. In the same vein, under the imitation-only
6Here efficiency or productivity of skilled and unskilled human capital are measured in terms of the
elasticity of skilled and unskilled human capital in the imitation and innovation activities.
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regime, imitation is unskilled human capital intensive, implying that σ > 1
2
and in the
innovation-only regime, innovation is skilled human capital intensive, such that φ < 1
2
.7
A2. World technology frontier is growing at a constant exogenous rate g¯.
2.3 Consumption Side
An individual lives for two time periods in an overlapping generations model. He/ she
has a log-linear utility function. Utility depends on individual’s consumption in both the
periods and the level of bequest that he/ she leaves for his/ her child. In the first period of
the life, an individual takes a decision on whether to opt for education or not. In the second
period, depending on the education decision taken, he/ she works as skilled/ unskilled
worker. Like Maoz and Moav [1999], complete absence of capital market is assumed,
so that individuals cannot borrow or lend. In other words, income and expenditure in
any two periods are independent. An individual spends the bequest received on the first
period consumption and education (if opted for it) and allocates the second period income
on own consumption and leaves a bequest for his/ her child. Individuals vary in their
cognitive ability, captured by parameter θ, which is uniformly distributed over the interval
[0, 1]. The cost of education is negatively related to the individual’s cognitive ability and
positively with the wage rate of unskilled worker. This is considered as the opportunity
cost of an individual to become skilled, that is,
E(θ, At−1) =
Hwut
θ
, (5)
where E(θ, At−1) captures the cost of education of an individual with θ cognitive ability
and H is any positive constant and wut is the wage rate of unskilled workers in period t.
Both skilled and unskilled workers maximize their lifetime utility subject to the budget
constraint. Each individual maximizes the following lifetime utility function:
Wk = ck,t,t
√
ck,t,t+1 xk,t,t+1, (6)
7In the diversified regime this work does not require any assumption on the absolute intensity of skilled
or unskilled human capital in the imitation or innovation activities. Hence, these parametric restrictions
pertain only to the specialized economies.
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where k = s, u. s and u respectively denote skilled and unskilled workers. Wk measures
the lifetime utility of the kth individual, ck,t,t is the consumption level of the k
th individual
in period t who is born in period t, ck,t,t+1 is the consumption level of k
th individual in
period (t+1) who is born in period t, and xk,t,t+1 is the level of bequest that k
th individual
who is born in period t leaves for his/ her child in period (t+ 1). The budget constraint
of skilled worker who is born in period t is given as:
cs,t,t +
Hwut
θ
= xt,t;
cs,t,t+1 + xs,t,t+1 = ws,t+1,
where ws,t+1 measures the wage rate of skilled worker at period (t+ 1), xt,t is the level of
bequest that an individual received from his/ her parent. It depends on whether his/ her
parent was skilled or unskilled worker. The budget constraint of unskilled worker who is
born in period t is
cu,t,t = xt,t;
cu,t,t+1 + xu,t,t+1 = wu,t+1.
Perfectly competitive labor market is assumed. Individuals have perfect foresight. Total
population is normalized to one. There is no population growth. Each parent has one
child. At the end of the tth generation, a new (t+ 1)th generation appears.
The interaction of production and consumption activities determine the equilibrium
composition of human capital. This, in turn, determines the allocation of skilled and
unskilled human capital between the imitation and innovation activities that ascertains
the overall technology improvement. Consequently, that determines the growth path,
convergence condition, wage, inequality and intergenerational mobilities paths of the
economy as time progresses.
3 Analytical Results
Key analytical findings of this research have been derived in this section. First, labor
supply curve is obtained. Next, the focus of the analysis is on the imitation-only regime
14
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followed by that on the innovation-only regime and finally on the imitation-innovation
regime. Under each case, the equilibrium composition of human capital, growth curve
and the wage paths of both the factors have been characterized. Furthermore, the long
run steady state condition has been examined. In addition, the relation between
intergenerational mobilities (upward and downward mobilities) and the wage inequality
of an economy depending on its distance to frontier have been illustrated. Finally,
comparative dynamics are worked out to understand the importance of the composition
of human capital at different stages of development.
3.1 Labor Supply
A detailed analysis has been made to determine the labor supply curve of the economy.
As already mentioned, income and consumption in two periods are not interrelated (since
credit market does not exist.). Thus, the second period utility function subject to the
second period budget constraint has been maximized. A log-linear utility function ensures
that an individual spends his/ her income equally on second period consumption and
bequest, that is, ck,t,t+1 = xk,t,t+1 =
wk,t+1
2
. An Individual opts for education if his/ her
lifetime income as skilled worker is greater than unskilled worker, specifically,
Ws ≥Wu
⇒
[
xt,t − Hwut
θ
]
ws,t+1
2
≥ xt,twu,t+1
2
[Using eq.(6)]
⇒ θt+1 ≥ Hwut
xt,t
[
1− wu,t+1
ws,t+1
] . (7)
An individual avails of the education option if his/ her cognitive ability is higher than a
threshold level as mentioned in eq. (7). As expected, this depends on the future wage gap
between skilled and unskilled human capital (incentive effect), level of bequest that an
individual received from his/ her parent (wealth effect) and also on the cost of education
(opportunity cost). If an individual’s parent was skilled, he/she receives a higher bequest
(that is, wst
2
) than an individual whose parent was unskilled (that is, wut
2
). Therefore, the
cutoff level of cognitive ability above which an individual goes for education depends on
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whether his/ her parent was educated or not.
θut+1 =
2H
1− wu,t+1
ws,t+1
and θst+1 =
2H xu,t
xs,t
1− wu,t+1
ws,t+1
, (8)
where θut+1 and θ
s
t+1 respectively measure the cut off cognitive ability above which an
individual goes for education if his/ her parent was unskilled and skilled. Note that
θst+1 < θ
u
t+1. It implies that child of an educated parent has higher opportunity of acquiring
education than child of an uneducated parent. So, education decision is not only correlated
with the cognitive ability of an individual but is also related to the parental education
decision and income. This finding is in line with Maoz and Moav [1999]. Therefore,
the proportion of unskilled (resp. skilled) human capital in period (t + 1) is a weighted
average of proportion of uneducated (resp. educated) individuals in period (t+ 1) having
educated parent in period t and the proportion of having uneducated parent in period t.8
The proportion of unskilled and skilled human capital in period (t+ 1) are respectively:
Ut+1 = θ
u
t+1Ut + θ
s
t+1St =
2H
[
Ut +
xu,t
xs,t
St
]
1− wu,t+1
ws,t+1
;
St+1 = 1− Ut+1. (9)
The proportion of unskilled (resp. skilled) human capital in period (t + 1) depends on
the composition of human capital in period t and also on the expected future wage gap
of skilled and unskilled human capital. So, there is a trade off between history vs.
expectation, as mentioned in Krugman [1991]. Historically if high wage inequality
prevails in the economy (that is, wealth effect is significant) that leads to a high
proportion of unskilled human capital. Similarly, if previous period’s relative
composition of skilled human capital is low that also implies a high proportion of
unskilled human capital in the next period. Both of these two factors capture the
history effect. However, if expected wage rate of skilled is higher than unskilled
(incentive effect) that leads to a lower proportion of unskilled human capital. Thus, it is
important to understand the dominating effect of the history vs. expectation.
8Educated individuals constitute the skilled set. So, this part of research use these two terminologies
as synonyms.
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3.2 Imitation-Only Regime
The features of the economies which are in the imitation-only regime have been
characterized in this subsection. First, the demand for skilled and unskilled workers are
derived. Next, the equilibrium proportion of skilled and unskilled workers are
ascertained. Finally, the growth path of an economy and the wage paths of skilled and
unskilled workers are determined for the imitation-only regime.
3.2.1 Demand for Skilled and Unskilled Human Capital
The demand curve of skilled and unskilled human capital in the imitation-only regime
can be derived as follows. From eqs. (1) and (2), the profit maximizing exercise of the
intermediate input producer is:
max
U˜i,t+1,S˜i,t+1,
δ Ait + λδU˜
σ
i,t+1S˜
1−σ
i,t+1
1
At+1
(At − At)−
[
wu,t+1U˜i,t+1 + ws,t+1S˜i,t+1
]
. (10)
From eq. (10), the first order conditions of the maximization exercise of R & D activity
have been derived in the imitation-only regime
∂LM1,t+1
∂U˜i,t+1
= λδ1σU˜
σ−1
i,t+1 S˜
1−σ
i,t+1
1
(1 + g¯)
(1− at)− wu,t+1 = 0;
∂LM1,t+1
∂S˜i,t+1
= λδ1(1− σ)U˜σi,t+1S˜−σi,t+1
1
(1 + g¯)
(1− at)− ws,t+1 = 0, (11)
where at =
At
At
measures the inverse distance of an economy from the world technology
frontier. In this research it is described as distance to frontier.
From the above first order conditions in a cluster of eqs. represented as (11), the
relative demand curve for skilled and unskilled human capital in the imitation-only regime
can be expressed as:
wu,t+1
ws,t+1
=
σ
(1− σ)
S˜i,t+1
U˜i,t+1
. (12)
Eq. (12) says that the equilibrium relative wage rate of skilled worker decreases as the
relative demand for skilled human capital rises. So, the relative demand curve is negatively
sloped in the relative wages.
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(a) Skilled and Unskilled Human Capital (b) Growth Rate
Figure 1: Imitation-Only Regime – Composition of Skilled and Unskilled Human Capital
and Growth Rate
3.2.2 Equilibrium
Next, equilibrium proportion of skilled and unskilled human capital in the imitation-
only regime has been analyzed. A perfectly competitive labor market ensures that at a
competitive wage rate, labor demand equates labor supply. From eqs. (9) and (12), the
proportion of unskilled human capital in the imitation-only regime is:
U˜t+1 = σ + 2H (1− σ)
[
U˜t +
xu,t
xs,t
S˜t
]
. (13)
Eq. (13), yields the proportion of skilled human capital as:
S˜t+1 = 1− U˜t+1 = (1− σ)
[
1− 2H
(
U˜t +
xu,t
xs,t
S˜t
)]
. (14)
Eq. (13), exhibits that there exists a positive proportion of unskilled human capital in the
imitation-only regime. To ensure the essentiality of skilled input, the following condition
is required:
S˜t+1 > 0 ⇒ H < 1
2
[
U˜t +
xu,t
xs,t
S˜t
] . (15)
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Condition in eq. (15) is not binded.9 Now, the question is how equilibrium proportion of
skilled or unskilled human capital changes as an economy bridges the gap from the frontier.
It depends on the last period’s wage inequality and the earlier period’s proportion of skilled
and unskilled human capital. Last period’s equilibrium values depend on the last to last
period and the process continues. Thus, the labor market equilibrium condition of the
initial period determines today’s outcome. These are history dependent in the imitation-
only regime. Therefore, simulation technique has been used. The arbitrary parameter
values are [λ, δ, γ, σ, φ, H, g¯, A1, U(1), a(1)] = [0.4, 0.6, 0.1, 0.6, 0.15, 0.1, 0.02, 10,
0.8, 0.01]. Specific arbitrary parameter values to represent the initial condition for the
imitation-only regime are [U(1), a(1)] = [0.8, 0.01]. These arbitrary parameter values
satisfied the regularity condition mentioned in Lemma 3 in Subsection 3.4 in page 30.
These specific parameter values imply that the economy is sufficiently backward and it
has a relatively high composition of unskilled human capital.10 Given that the initial
parameter values are arbitrarily given, there exists an initial change in the equilibrium
proportion of unskilled human capital. Given diminishing return of the imitation activity
(since scope of imitation falls) as an economy progresses, marginal productivity of both
skilled and unskilled human capital fall. However, that negative effect is similar to both
the factors. Thus, there exists a constant composition of human capital (as shown in Fig.
1a in page 18). By A1, imitation is unskilled human capital intensive. This implies that
equilibrium level of unskilled human capital is higher than skilled human capital in the
imitation-only regime (as illustrated in Fig. 1a in page 18).
3.2.3 Growth Rate
The growth rate of an economy in the imitation-only regime has been characterized. From
eq. (2), one gets,
g˜t+1 =
1∫
0
Ai,t+1 −Ai,t
Ait
di =
λ
(1 + g¯)At
U˜σt+1S˜
(1−σ)
t+1
(1− at)
at
,
9One can show the nonbindedness of this condition by using Lemma 3 in Subsection 3.4 in page 30.
10Lemma 3 in Subsection 3.4 in page 30 postulates these characteristics for the imitation-only regime.
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(a) Wage Paths (b) Between Group Wage Inequality
Figure 2: Imitation-Only Regime – Wage and Inequality Paths of Skilled-Unskilled Human
Capital
where, g˜t+1 measures the growth rate of an economy in period t + 1. Growth rate of
an economy depends on the composition of skilled and unskilled human capital and its
distance to frontier. This implies that growth path is history dependent (since composition
of human capital is history dependent). Therefore, analytical solution is hard to get. So,
numerical simulation is again used. As the relative gap of an economy from the world
technology frontier decreases, the scope of imitation decreases. Consequently, increment
of technology is lower. That leads to a lower growth rate as an economy progresses in the
specialized backward regime (as shown in Fig. 1b in page 18).
3.2.4 Wage Rate
The wage paths of skilled and unskilled workers in the imitation-only regime have been
illustrated. Furthermore, the focus is on the analysis of the relative wage gap between
skilled and unskilled workers. From a cluster of eqs. named as (11) and eq. (13), wage
rate of the different composition of workers are also history dependent as is similar to
the equilibrium proportion of skilled and unskilled human capital. Therefore, analytical
solutions are not feasible, and hence simulation technique has been used. As an economy
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progresses, the scope of imitation falls, consequently marginal productivity of both skilled
and unskilled workers fall and so do the wage paths of both the factors fall (also depicted
in Fig. 2a in page 20). However, that diminishing effect is same to both the factors.
Consequently, there exists a constant level of wage inequality between skilled and unskilled
workers in the imitation-only regime (Fig. 2b in page 20 also supports that).
3.3 Innovation-Only Regime
Now, the focus of this study is on the innovation-only regime. The following subsection
derives the equilibrium proportion of skilled and unskilled human capital. Consequently,
these determine the growth rate of an economy. Furthermore, the wage paths of an
economy in the innovation-only regime are also derived.
3.3.1 Demand for Skilled and Unskilled Human Capital
First, the demand curve for skilled and unskilled workers have been examined. From
eqs. (1) and (4), maximization exercise of the R & D activity of the intermediate input
producers in the innovation-only regime is:
max
Ûi,t+1,Ŝi,t+1,
δAi,t + λγδ1Û
φ
i,t+1Ŝ
1−φ
i,t+1At −
[
wu,t+1Ûi,t+1 + ws,t+1Ŝi,t+1
]
.
The first-order conditions associated with this maximization exercise are:
∂LN1,t+1
∂Ûi,t+1
= λδγφÛφ−1i,t+1 Ŝ
1−φ
i,t+1At − wu,t+1 = 0;
∂LN1,t+1
∂Ŝi,t+1
= λγδ(1− φ)Ûσi,t+1Ŝ−φi,t+1At − ws,t+1 = 0. (16)
From the cluster of eqs. named as (16), the relative demand for skilled-unskilled human
capital in the innovation-only regime is
wu,t+1
ws,t+1
=
φ
(1− φ)
Ŝi,t+1
Ûi,t+1
. (17)
A negatively sloped demand curve exists. As the relative wage rate of skilled worker rises
the relative demand for skilled human capital falls.
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(a) Skilled and Unskilled Human Capital (b) Growth Rate
Figure 3: Innovation-Only Regime – Composition of Skilled and Unskilled Human Capital
and Growth Rate
3.3.2 Equilibrium
By equating the demand and supply curve, the equilibrium proportion of skilled and
unskilled human capital in the innovation-only regime have been derived from eqs. (9)
and (17):
Ût+1 = φ+ 2H (1− φ)
[
Ût +
xu,t
xs,t
Ŝt
]
;
Ŝt+1 = (1− φ)
[
1− 2H
(
Ût +
xu,t
xs,t
Ŝt
)]
. (18)
Equilibrium proportion of unskilled human capital is always positive. The regularity
condition for the positive stock of skilled human capital is the following:
Now, Ŝt+1 > 0 ⇒ H < 1
2
[
Ût +
xu,t
xs,t
Ŝt
] . (19)
Similar to the imitation-only regime, here also the stock of skilled and unskilled human
capital in period (t + 1) are history dependent. Thus, behaviour of the composition of
human capital have been characterized by applying simulation. The specific parametric
values for the innovation-only regime are [U(1), a(1)] = [0.3, 0.6]. These capture the
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(a) Wage Paths (b) Between Group Wage Inequality
Figure 4: Innovation-Only Regime – Wage and Inequality Paths of Skilled and Unskilled
Human Capital
feature of an economy which is in the advanced specialized regime. It implies that
economy is sufficiently advanced and it has a high proportion of skilled to unskilled
ratio. It also satisfies all the regularity conditions imposed by the model as illustrated in
eq. (19) and also in Lemma 3 in Subsection 3.4 in page 30. By A1, innovation is
skilled intensive. Therefore, the proportion of skilled human capital is higher than
unskilled human capital in the innovation-only regime (as clear from Fig. 3a in page 22).
Moreover, as an economy progresses, marginal productivity of both skilled and unskilled
human capital rise. However, that increment has similar effect to both the factors.
Therefore, there exists constant proportion of skilled and unskilled human capital.
3.3.3 Growth Rate
From eq. (4), the growth rate of an economy in the innovation-only regime (denoted
as ĝt+1) is ĝt+1 = λγÛ
φ
t+1Ŝ
(1−φ)
t+1 . The growth rate depends on the composition of human
capital, such that, this too turns out to be history dependent. Given that there exists
a fixed proportion of skilled and unskilled human capital, there exists a constant level of
growth rate in the innovation-only regime (as shown in Fig. 3b in page 22).
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3.3.4 Wage Rate
Next, wage paths of skilled and unskilled workers are discussed. From the cluster of eqs.
named as (16) imply that as an economy progresses, the technology level rises, which
entails an increment in efficiency of the innovation activity. This raises the marginal
productivity of both skilled and unskilled workers and consequently, increase the wage
rate of both types of workers. This is also depicted in Fig. 4a in page 23. However,
these increment have similar effect to both the factors. This implies that after the initial
adjustment (due to choice of initial values) there exists a constant level of between group
wage inequality in the innovation-only regime. Numerical simulation also exhibits similar
result in Fig. 4b in page 23.
3.4 Imitation-Innovation Regime
This subsection, first, derives the demand curve for both skilled and unskilled human
capital in the imitation and in the innovation activities. Subsequently, the equilibrium
allocation of both types of human capital are ascertained. Finally, the growth rate and
wage paths of skilled and unskilled workers for an economy which is in the diversified
regime have been characterized.
3.4.1 Demand for Skilled and Unskilled Human Capital
From eqs. (1) and (3), maximization exercise of the R & D producer in the diversified
regime is
max
umi,t+1,uni,t+1,smi,t+1,sni,t+1
λδ
[
uσmi,t+1s
1−σ
mi,t+1
1
At+1
(At − At) + γuφni,t+1s1−φni,t+1At
]
− [wu,t+1(umi,t+1 + uni,t+1) + ws,t+1(smi,t+1 + sni,t+1)] . (20)
First-order maximizing conditions in the R & D sector have been derived for the imitation-
innovation regime. From eq. (20), one gets that:
∂L1,t+1
∂umi,t+1
= λδσuσ−1mi,t+1s
1−σ
mi,t+1
1
At+1
(At − At)− wu,t+1 = 0;
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∂L1,t+1
∂uni,t+1
= λδγφuφ−1ni,t+1s
1−φ
ni,t+1At − wu,t+1 = 0;
∂L1,t+1
∂smi,t+1
= λδ(1− σ)uσmi,t+1s−σmi,t+1
1
At+1
(At − At)− ws,t+1 = 0;
∂L1,t+1
∂sni,t+1
= λδγ(1− φ)uφni,t+1s−φni,t+1At − ws,t+1 = 0. (21)
Given that all intermediate good producers are ex-ante identical, they face the same
maximization problem. Thus, in equilibrium:
umi,t+1 = um,t+1, uni,t+1 = un,t+1, smi,t+1 = sm,t+1 and sni,t+1 = sn,t+1. (22)
There is mass 1 of intermediate firms, so that labor market equilibrium condition is
St+1 = sm,t+1 + sn,t+1, and Ut+1 = um,t+1 + un,t+1. (23)
From the first-order conditions in the cluster of eqs. named as (21) and by using eq.
(22), one gets the relative demand curves for skilled and unskilled human capital in the
imitation and innovation activities respectively as:
ws,t+1
wu,t+1
=
(1− σ)
σ
um,t+1
sm,t+1
; and
ws,t+1
wu,t+1
=
(1− φ)
φ
un,t+1
sn,t+1
. (24)
Equalization of the relative wage rate in eq. (24) implies:
ψ
sm,t+1
um,t+1
=
sn,t+1
un,t+1
, (25)
where, ψ = σ(1−φ)
φ(1−σ) > 1, by A1.
Accordingly, the demand for skilled and unskilled human capital in the imitation and
innovation activities are worked out to be:
sn,t+1 =
ψ St+1 − h(at) Ut+1
ψ − 1 ; sm,t+1 =
h(at) Ut+1 − St+1
ψ − 1 ;
un,t+1 =
ψSt+1 − h(at) Ut+1
(ψ − 1) h(at) ; um,t+1 =
ψ[h(at) Ut+1 − St+1]
(ψ − 1) h(at) . (26)
where h(at) =
[
(1−σ)ψσ(1−at)
γ(1−φ)(1+g¯)Atat
] 1
(σ−φ)
, which is a decreasing function of the distance to
frontier. That is, h′(at) = − h(at)(σ−φ)at(1−at) < 0.
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From eq. (26), the relative demand for skilled and unskilled human capital in the
imitation and in the innovation activities are estimated to be:
sm,t+1
um,t+1
=
h(at)
ψ
;
sn,t+1
un,t+1
= h(at). (27)
3.4.2 Equilibrium
By equating the demand and supply curves of skilled and unskilled human capital, the
equilibrium level of both types can be ascertained in the diversified regime. Furthermore,
the equilibrium allocation of skilled and unskilled human capital in the imitation and
innovation activities can also be derived.
First the cutoff level of cognitive ability above which an individual goes for education
given that his/ her parent was educated or not is determined. Substituting eqs. (24) and
(27) in eq. (8), one gets,
θut+1 =
2H
1− φ
(1−φ)h(at)
; θst+1 =
2H xu,t
xs,t
1− φ
(1−φ)h(at)
. (28)
From eq. (28), the proportion of unskilled human capital in the imitation-innovation
regime is derived to be:
Ut+1 = θ
s
t+1St + θ
u
t+1Ut =
2H(1− φ)
[
Ut +
xut
xst
St
]
[(1− φ)− φh(at)] . (29)
Next, the equilibrium proportion of skilled human capital in the imitation-innovation
regime can be derived from eq. (29) as:
St+1 = 1− Ut+1 = 1−
2H(1− φ)
[
Ut +
xut
xst
St
]
[(1− φ)− φh(at)] . (30)
Given the essentiality of both the inputs the following conditions are needed as well:
Ut+1 > 0 ⇒ [(1− φ)− φh(at)] > 0;
St+1 > 0 ⇒ 1−
2H(1− φ)
[
Ut +
xut
xst
St
]
[(1− φ)− φh(at)] > 0 ⇒ H <
[(1− φ)− φh(at)]
2(1− φ)
[
Ut +
xut
xst
St
] . (31)
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Regularity condition in eq. (31) is not binded.11 Some comparative dynamics analyses
have been attempted. The change in the total stock of skilled and unskilled human capital
as an economy progresses has been examined. Since, the equilibrium proportion of skilled
and unskilled human capital are history dependent, analytical solutions are not feasible.
Therefore, numerical simulation has been done. The following specific parameter values
assumed in the diversified regime are [a(1), U(1)] = [0.5, 0.65]. It implies that economy
is neither sufficiently backward nor sufficiently advanced. It has intermediate values in
terms of the distance to frontier. Moreover, it neither has relatively high nor relatively
low composition of skilled human capital. Arbitrary parameter values also satisfy the
regularity condition mentioned in Lemma 3 in Subsection 3.4 in page 30.
The catch-up component is high for a technologically backward economy. As an
economy progresses, the relative gap of that economy from the world technology frontier
decreases. Consequently, the relative importance of imitation activity decreases and that
of innovation activity rises. From A1, in equilibrium the proportion of unskilled human
capital falls and skilled human capital rises as an economy progresses, that is, ∂ Ut+1
∂ at
< 0
and ∂ St+1
∂ at
> 0, as shown in Fig. 5a in page 28.
Lemma 1 Under A1,
• In the imitation-only regime, there exists a fixed composition of skilled and unskilled
human capital. Moreover, equilibrium proportion of skilled human capital is lower
than unskilled human capital.
• In the innovation-only regime also there exists a constant composition of skilled
and unskilled human capital. Additionally, equilibrium proportion of skilled human
capital is higher than unskilled human capital in the innovation-only regime.
• For a country which is in the imitation-innovation regime, proportion of skilled
human capital increases and unskilled human capital decreases as a country moves
to the world technology frontier.
11One can show the nonbindedness of this condition by using Lemma 3 in page 30.
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(a) (b)
Figure 5: Diversified Regime – Skilled-Unskilled Human Capital and Allocation of it in
Imitation and Innovation Activities
From the cluster of eqs. named as (26) and eqs. (29) and (30), the equilibrium allocation
of skilled and unskilled human capital can be ascertained in the imitation and in the
innovation activities.
sm,t+1 =
2 H (1− φ)[1 + h(at)]
[
Ut +
xut
xst
St
]
(ψ − 1) [(1− φ)− φh(at)] −
1
(ψ − 1);
um,t+1 =
2 H ψ (1− φ)[1 + h(at)]
[
Ut +
xut
xst
Ut
]
(ψ − 1)h(at) [(1− φ)− φh(at)] −
ψ
(ψ − 1) h(at) ;
sn,t+1 =
ψ
(ψ − 1) −
2 H (1− φ)
[
Ut +
xut
xst
St
]
[ψ + h(at)]
(ψ − 1) [(1− φ)− φh(at)] ;
un,t+1 =
ψ
(ψ − 1)h(at) −
2 H (1− φ)
[
Ut +
xut
xst
St
]
[ψ + h(at)]
(ψ − 1) h(at) [(1− φ)− φh(at)] . (32)
Comparative dynamics have been carried out to capture change in allocation of skilled and
unskilled human capital in both the imitation and the innovation activities as an economy
progresses. By Lemma 1 and A1, as the proportion of skilled (resp. unskilled) human
capital increases (resp. decreases) innovation attracts more skilled human capital than
imitation as the gap from the world technology frontier falls. Due to complementarity,
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unskilled human capital also shifts from imitation to innovation. This attracts even more
skilled human capital into innovation activity and so on. Therefore, in equilibrium, both
skilled and unskilled human capital increase in the innovation activity and decrease in the
imitation activity, as is shown in Fig. 5b in page 28. That is, d sm,t+1
d at
< 0, d um,t+1
d at
< 0,
d sn,t+1
d at
> 0 and d un,t+1
d at
> 0.12
Lemma 2 Under A1,
In the imitation-innovation regime, the proportion of both skilled and unskilled human
capital shift away from the imitation activity to the innovation activity as an economy
bridges its gap from the world technology frontier.
Next, the regularity conditions for the existence of positive amounts of both skilled and
unskilled human capital in the imitation and innovation activities have been derived.
That is, it is required that sm,t+1 > 0, sm,t+1 < St+1, sn,t+1 > 0, sn,t+1 < St+1, um,t+1 > 0,
um,t+1 < Ut+1, un,t+1 > 0 and un,t+1 < Ut+1. From eq. (32), this entails the following
regularity condition:
h(at)
ψ
<
St+1
Ut+1
< h(at) [From eqs.(26)]
⇒ [(1− φ)− φh(at)]
2 (1− φ) [1 + h(at)]
[
St +
xst
xut
Ut
] < H < ψ [(1− φ)− φ h(at)]
2 (1− φ)[ψ + h(at)]
[
St +
xst
xut
Ut
] .
It is known that h(at) is a decreasing function of at. In one hand, given any fixed
composition of skilled-unskilled human capital (that is, with a fixed value of St+1
Ut+1
), a
significantly technologically backward economies, (that is, economies with enough low
at), specialize in the imitation activity, sufficiently technologically advanced economies
(that is, economies with enough high at) specialize in the innovation activity and the
intermediate economies perform both the activities. On the other hand, by A1, given
any fixed distance to frontier, an economy with significantly high (resp. low)
composition of skilled to unskilled human capital ratio specializes in the innovation
(resp. imitation) activity and the intermediate economies perform both the activities. In
12Allocation of skilled and unskilled human capital in the imitation and innovation activities are also
history dependent. Thus, for dynamics analysis, one needs to take the help of numerical simulation.
29
Intergenerational Mobility
this analysis, parametric value H represents the cost of education. A higher (resp.
lower) H implies higher (resp. lower) cost of education and lower (resp. higher)
equilibrium proportion of skilled human capital in the economy, entailing that the
economy depends more on the imitation (resp. innovation) activity.
Lemma 3 Under A1,
• For technology improvement an economy performs both imitation and innovation
activities if and only if
[(1− φ)− φh(at)]
2 (1− φ) [1 + h(at)]
[
St +
xst
xut
Ut
] < H < ψ [(1− φ)− φ h(at)]
2 (1− φ)[ψ + h(at)]
[
St +
xst
xut
Ut
] ;
• an economy specializes in imitation-only regime if and only if
[(1− φ)− φh(at)]
2 (1− φ) [1 + h(at)]
[
St +
xst
xut
Ut
] > H;
• and an economy specializes in innovation-only regime if
ψ [(1− φ)− φ h(at)]
2 (1− φ)[ψ + h(at)]
[
St +
xst
xut
Ut
] < H.
3.4.3 Growth Rate
Now, the growth rate has been derived for an economy which is in the diversified regime.
From eq. (3), (26), (27) and (29), one gets,
gt+1 = λ
[
uσm,t+1 s
1−σ
m,t+1
1
At+1
(
1− at
at
)
+ γ uφn,t+1s
1−φ
n,t+1
]
= λ
(um,t+1sm,t+1
)σ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+ve
sm,t+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
−ve
1
At+1
(1− at)
at︸ ︷︷ ︸
−ve
+ γ
(
un,t+1
sn,t+1
)φ
sn,t+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
+ve

= λ γ(1− φ) h−φ(at)
[
1− 2H
(
St +
xst
xut
Ut
)]
. (33)
Positive growth rate entails that H < 1
2
(
St+
xst
xut
Ut
) . However, this condition is not binded.
From eq. (33), it is easy to see that the growth rate of an economy in the diversified regime
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depends on the relative intensity of unskilled and skilled human capital in the imitation
and innovation activities, the allocation of skilled human capital in these two activities
and the distance of an economy from the world technology frontier. From eq. (27), it is
found that the relative intensity of unskilled-skilled human capital in these two activities
depend positively on the distance to frontier. The allocation of skilled human capital
in the imitation (resp. innovation) activity depends negatively (resp. positively) on the
distance to frontier. Obviously, the relative gap from the frontier declines as an economy
progresses. Interaction of all of these factors determine the growth rate of an economy
which is in the diversified regime. Eq. (33) reveals that growth rate is history dependent.
Therefore, numerical simulation is required to understand the growth path. From Fig. 6a
in page 32, it is clear that the growth rate initially falls and thereafter rises as an economy
progresses. It is a U-shaped growth curve. As an economy shifts from the imitation-only
regime to the diversified regime, the scope for both imitation and innovation are low. In
one hand, scope of imitation is low since the advantage of backwardness is falling as an
economy progresses. On the other hand, scope of innovation is also low at the initial
stages of development of the diversified regime, since technology level is not sufficiently
high. Further, from Lemma 1, the relative proportion of skilled human capital is also
short in supply. This causes the falling part of the growth path in the diversified regime.
As the time progresses, the opportunity for innovation rises and again from Lemma 1,
the proportion of skilled human capital rises that leads to an incrementally higher rate of
growth.
Proposition 1 Under A1,
• In the imitation-only regime, growth rate falls as an economy progresses.
• In the diversified regime, growth rate initially falls and thereafter rises as an economy
progresses, that is, there exists a U-shaped growth path.
• In the innovation-only regime, there exists a constant growth rate.
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(a) Growth Rate (b) Wage Paths
Figure 6: Diversified Regime – Growth Rate and Wage Paths of Skilled and Unskilled
Human Capital
3.4.4 Wage Rate
The discussion now shifts to the dynamics paths of the wage rate of skilled and unskilled
workers as an economy bridges its gap from the world frontier. Substituting eq. (27) in
the cluster of eqs. named as (21), one gets,
wu, t+1 = λδγφh
1−φ(at)atAt;
ws, t+1 = λδγ(1− φ)h−φ(at)atAt.
In the diversified regime, as an economy progresses, the relative importance of innovation
increases and imitation decreases. From A1, marginal productivity of skilled human
capital increases and unskilled human capital decreases and so the wage rate of skilled
workers rises and unskilled workers falls. Consequently, the wage gap between skilled and
unskilled workers grows, as demonstrated in Fig. 6b in page 32.
Proposition 2 Under A1,
• In the imitation-only regime, wage rate of skilled and unskilled workers fall as an
economy progresses. There exists a constant level of wage inequality between skilled
and unskilled groups.
32
Intergenerational Mobility
(a) Imitation-Only Regime (b) Innovation-Only Regime
Figure 7: Steady State – Specialized Regimes
• In the Diversified regime, wage rate of skilled workers rises and unskilled workers
falls as an economy steps forward to the world frontier. Wage inequality between
skilled and unskilled workers rises as an economy bridges the gap from the world
technology frontier.
• In the innovation-only regime, wage rate of skilled and unskilled workers rise as an
economy progresses. There exists a constant level of wage inequality between skilled
and unskilled workers.
3.5 Steady State
Long run equilibrium condition of an economy has been illustrated in this subsection.
It attempts to find an answer to: as the time progresses does an economy converge its
gap from the world technology frontier, depending on its distance to the frontier. The
definition of growth rate can be specified as:
gt+1 =
At+1 − At
At
=
At+1
At+1
At
At
(1 + g¯)− 1
⇒ at+1 = (1 + gt+1)
(1 + g¯)
at (34)
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Figure 8: Steady State – Diversified Regime
If the growth rate of an economy is higher than the growth rate of the world leader, then
the economy will be able to converge to the frontier, and in the long run, it will catch up
with the frontier technology level.13 Numerical simulation also corroborates this. From
Fig. 7a in page 33, Fig. 7b in page 33 and Fig. 8 in page 34, it is clear that as an economy
progresses it closes its distance from the world technology frontier. In the long run all
the economies will converge to the world technology level. Steady state implies that at
will converge to a∗, that is, at → a∗ and the growth rate of the economy will converge
to g∗, that is, gt → g∗. Therefore, eq. (34) implies that either g∗ = g¯ or a∗ = 0. In the
long run all the economies will grow at the same rate. That is, there exists absolute
convergence of the economies in the long run.
Proposition 3 In the long-run all the economies will converge to the world technology
frontier irrespective of its distance to frontier. Moreover, in the steady state, all the
economies will grow at the same rate.
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Figure 9: Upward and Downward Mobility – Diversified Regime
3.6 Intergenerational Mobility
This subsection involves an analysis on upward and downward mobilities of individuals.
Upward mobility is implied by the phenomena that an individual works as a skilled worker
given that his/ her parent was unskilled, that is,
UMt+1 = Ut(1− θut+1),
where, UMt+1 measures upward mobility in period (t + 1). It captures the probability of
moving from low equilibrium to high equilibrium. Proportion of skilled human capital
(that is, (1 − θut+1)) whose parents were unskilled (that is, Ut). It is a cross product of
today’s skilled people with earlier period’s unskilled individuals. Next, downward mobility
implies that parent was skilled but child is working as an unskilled worker, that is,
DMt+1 = Stθ
s
t+1,
where DMt+1 measures downward mobility in period (t + 1). It is the opposite of the
upward mobility. It captures the probability of moving from high to low equilibrium. It
is a cross product of the proportion of today’s unskilled human capital ( that is, θst+1)
whose parent was skilled (that is, St). Intergenerational mobilities assist to analyze the
13The economy will catch up if next period’s distance to frontier (that is, at+1) is higher than the earlier
period’s distance from the world technology frontier (that is, at).
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(a) Imitation-Only Regime (b) Innovation-Only Regime
Figure 10: Upward and Downward Mobility – Specialized Regimes
correlation between cognitive ability and income of an individual. Low mobility implies
that individuals whose parents have high (resp. low) income have high chance of working
as skilled (resp. unskilled). Now, the focus of the study is to identify the dynamics paths
of upward and downward mobilities in the diversified regime. From Proposition 2, in
the diversified regime, the wage gap between skilled and unskilled human capital rise as an
economy progresses technologically. Individuals whose parents were unskilled and left a
lesser amount of bequest has lower probability of becoming educated than the individuals’s
whose parents were skilled. Subsequently, upward and downward mobilities fall as an
economy progresses (as shown in Fig. 9 in page 35). As gap from the world frontier
falls chances of shifting from low equilibrium to high equilibrium as well as from high
equilibrium to low equilibrium fall in the diversified regime. In the specialized regimes,
from Lemma 1, there exists a fixed proportion of the composition of human capital and
from Proposition 2, there exists constant wage inequality. This implies a constant level
of upward and downward mobilities in the specialized regimes, as is also shown in Fig.
10a in page 36 and Fig. 10b in page 36. To conclude, if parents were educated (skilled)
the probability of the children being educated rises and if parents were unskilled then
the opportunity for the children becoming educated falls. That is, education becomes
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(a) Due to Parental Income Difference (b) Due to Cognitive Ability Difference
Figure 11: Imitation-Only Regime – Life time Utility Gaps within Skilled and Unskilled
Human Capital
more correlated with parental income and less correlated with child’s cognitive ability. It
implies that as wage inequality between groups rises mobility falls. There exists a negative
relation between intergenerational mobilities and wage inequality.
Proposition 4 Under A1,
• In the imitation-only and innovation-only regimes there exists a constant level of
upward and downward mobilities as an economy bridges the gap from the world
technology frontier.
• In the Diversified regime, both upward and downward mobilities fall as an economy
progresses.
3.7 Life Time Utility
First, average life time utility of skilled and unskilled human capital given their parental
income have been determined in this subsection. Second, within skilled and unskilled
groups life time utility gap due to parental income differences have been worked out.
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(a) Due to Parental Income Difference (b) Due to Cognitive Ability Difference
Figure 12: Diversified Regime – Life time Utility Gaps within Skilled and Unskilled
Human Capital
Finally, within skilled group life time utility gap due to differences in the cognitive ability
among individuals has been ascertained. From eq. (6), life time utility of skilled and
unskilled human capital are defined as a function of consumption levels in both the periods
of life and the level of bequest that they leave for their children. This in turn depends
on the wage income of that individual and also on the level of bequest that he/ she
receives from parent and also on the cost of education (if he/ she is skilled). Level of
bequest received and cost of education respectively vary among individuals depending on
the parental income and cognitive ability. Average cost of education of individuals whose
parents were skilled and unskilled are respectively the weighted average of the cost of
education of an individual with highest and lowest cognitive ability who go for education
depending on parents were skilled and unskilled. Average life time utility of a skilled
individual whose parents were skilled and unskilled respectively denoted by W sst+1 and
W sut+1, specifically, from eq. (6), are given by:
W sst+1 =
[
wst
2
−
H wut
θ
|θ=1 +H wutθ |θ= θst+1
2
]
wst+1
2
;
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(a) Due to Parental Income Difference (b) Due to Cognitive Ability Difference
Figure 13: Innovation-Only Regime – Life time Utility Gap within Skilled and Unskilled
Human Capital
W sut+1 =
[
wut
2
−
H wut
θ
|θ=1 +H wutθ |θ= θut+1
2
]
wst+1
2
.
Given the same level of bequest, consumption of kth individual in first period of life is
positively related with the cognitive ability of an individual (since first period consumption
is the gap between the level of bequest received from parents and the cost of education.)
Average life time utility of an unskilled individual whose parent was skilled and unskilled
respectively denoted by W ust+1 and W
uu
t+1, specifically, from eq. (6), are given by:
W ust+1 =
wst
2
wut+1
2
and W uut+1 =
wut
2
wut+1
2
.
Now, life time utility gap within skilled and unskilled human capital have been defined.
First, life time utility gap due to parental income differences have been analyzed.
Winst+1 =
W sst+1
W sut+1
; Winut+1 =
W ust+1
W uut+1
,
where Winst+1 and Win
u
t+1 respectively measure life time utility gap within skilled and
unskilled human capital due to differences in the parental education level. From
Proposition 2, as an economy moves toward the world technology frontier, wage gap
between skilled and unskilled workers rise in the diversified regime. Therefore, gap
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(a) Unskilled Human Capital (b) Growth Rate
Figure 14: Imitation-Only Regime – Comparative Static wrt Cost of Education
between the level of bequest that a skilled as well as unskilled individuals get from
parents due to difference in the parental income rise. This leads to a higher life time
utility gap within skilled as well as unskilled human capital due to differences in the
parental income as is shown in Fig. 12a in page 38. From Proposition 2, in the
specialized regimes, there exists a constant wage inequality between skilled and unskilled
workers. This implies that there exists a constant gap between the level of bequest due
to difference in parental income. This leads to a constant life time utility gap within
skilled as well as unskilled human capital due to difference in parental income, as are
visible from Fig. 11a in page 37 and Fig. 13a in page 39.
Next, life time utility gap among skilled human capital due to differences in the
cognitive ability has been illustrated.
Winθst+1 =
W sst+1|θ=1
W sst+1|θ=θs
; Winθut+1 =
W sut+1|θ=1
W sut+1|θ=θu
,
where Winθst+1 and Win
θu
t+1 respectively measure life time utility gap due to cognitive
ability differences among skilled human capital even if all of their parents were skilled
and unskilled. These capture the life time utility gap due to difference in cognitive
ability through the lifetime utility gap of skilled human capital with highest and lowest
cognitive ability. By Lemma 1, as an economy progresses skilled human rises in the
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(a) Unskilled Human Capital (b) Growth Rate
Figure 15: Innovation-Only Regime – Comparative Static wrt Cost of Education
diversified regime. This in turn implies that individuals with relatively low cognitive
ability now become educated. As a result of which cost gap among skilled human capital
rises irrespective of their parental income levels. This leads to a higher wealth inequality
within skilled human capital due to difference in cognitive ability. To conclude, in the
diversified regime, due to difference in cognitive ability, lifetime utility gap within skilled
human capital rises irrespective of their parental education status as an economy
progresses, as is depicted in Fig. 12b in page 38. Moreover, from eq. (8), it is known
that θst+1 < θ
u
t+1. This implies that children of skilled parents work as skilled even with
relatively low cognitive ability than individuals with unskilled parents. Therefore,
among skilled human capital life time utility gap is high due to difference in cognitive
ability for the individuals whose parents were skilled than whose parents were unskilled.
Given that there exists a fixed composition of human capital in the specialized regimes,
there also exists constant level of life time utility gap within skilled human capital due
to difference in cognitive ability. This is true for both the cases – where parents were
either skilled or unskilled, as are shown in Fig. 11b in page 37 and Fig. 13b in page 39.
Proposition 5 Under A1,
• In the imitation-only and in the innovation-only regimes, there exists constant level
41
Intergenerational Mobility
(a) Unskilled Human Capital (b) Skilled in Imitation
Figure 16: Diversified Regime – Comparative Static wrt Cost of Education
of life time utility gap within skilled as well as unskilled human capital due to parental
income differences. Whereas there exists constant level of life time utility gap within
skilled human capital due to cognitive ability differences, in the specialized regimes.
• In the imitation-innovation regime, life time utility gap within skilled and unskilled
human capital rise due to parental income differences. Moreover, life time utility
gap within skilled human capital rises due to cognitive ability differences. However,
lifetime utility gap within skilled human capital due to cognitive ability differences is
higher if parents were skilled than unskilled workers.
3.8 Comparative Static Analysis w.r.t Cost of Education
The main focus is to look at the impact of an increment in the cost of education (in terms
of a change in the parametric value H) on the composition of human capital and also on
the growth rate of an economy. Due to a parametric positive shift in cost of education,
income of an individual who works as a skilled worker decreases whereas income of that
individual by working as an unskilled worker remains unchanged. Therefore, increment
in cost of education reduces proportion of skilled human capital and increases unskilled
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(a) Unskilled in Innovation (b) Growth Rate
Figure 17: Diversified Regime – Comparative Static wrt Cost of Education
human capital, irrespective of its distance to frontier, as are shown in Fig. 14a in page
40, in Fig. 15a in page 41 and in Fig. 16a in page 42. By A1, imitation depends more on
unskilled human capital. Therefore, a hike in cost of education raises the proportion of
unskilled human capital and consequently the growth rate of an economy which is in the
imitation-only regime. This implies that unskilled human capital is growth enhancing in
the imitation-only regime. Due to reduction in the proportion of skilled human capital
by A1, growth rate falls in the innovation-only regime, as is illustrated in Fig. 15b in
page 41. This in turn implies that skilled human capital is growth enhancing in the
innovation-only regime.
In the diversified regime by A1 and Lemma 2, both skilled and unskilled human
capital shift from innovation to imitation activities and consequently growth rate falls, as
are shown in Fig. 16b in page 42, in Fig. 17a in page 43 and in Fig. 17b in page 43.
Skilled human capital is growth enhancing in the imitation-innovation regime.
Proposition 6 Under A1,
• In the imitation-only regime unskilled human capital is growth enhancing.
• In the imitation-innovation and innovation-only regimes, skilled human capital is
growth enhancing.
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.4 Conclusion
Technological progress is a dual phenomenon. A country can improve its technology
level by imitating from the world technology frontier or by innovating new knowledge.
An economy which is lagging far behind the frontier can improve its technology level
by allocating its labor force mainly into imitation. Similarly, an advanced economy can
progress technologically by innovating. Under the assumption that different types of
human capital are efficient in different activities, Vandenbussche et al. [2006], Aghion
et al. [2009] and Basu and Mehra [2014] show that unskilled human capital is the main
source of growth for the technologically backward economy and skilled human capital is
the main source of growth for the technologically advanced economy. Now, by utilizing
an endogenous growth model, with complete absence of credit market, it is shown that
growth maximizing level of skilled and unskilled human capital is different for economies
depending on its distance from the world technology frontier. Moreover, in the diversified
regime probability of becoming rich (resp. poor) given that parents were rich (resp. poor)
rise as an economy progresses. That is, as an economy progresses, correlation between
income and cognitive ability falls. Moreover, between skilled and unskilled group wage
inequality rises in the diversified regime as an economy bridges its gap from the frontier.
There exists a positive correlation between equality and intergenerational upward and
downward mobilities. Along with that, there exists a U-shaped growth path depending
on its distance to frontier. Additionally, by applying growth enhancing education policy,
all the economies converge to the world frontier. Without any distortions, like migration
and outsourcing, there exists absolute convergence of all the economies irrespective of its
distance to frontier.
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